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UNAuTHORIZED PRAcrxcE OF LAW-MoRTGAGE CoMPANy's CAA.RGING
FoR ATroRNjE's Trr= ExAMINATiON-Respondent corporation was en-
gaged in making loans secured by mortgages on real estate. Before
any loan was made, an attorney's examination of the title to the
property was required. Respondent engaged its own lawyer at a fixed
salary to perform various legal services consisting principally of
examining and passing judgment on the titles to all properties which
would be mortgaged to it.1 The attorney did not receive a legal fee
for each examination, and the statement of service charges made by
the respondent to the borrower at the time of the closing contained an
item "exam. of title," for which no specific charge was made.2 Norm-
ally, separate charges were not listed but rather a total amount was
entered according to a graduated scale based on the amount of each
loan. An original contempt proceeding was brought by the petitioner
charging respondent with engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law by (1) rendering title examination service for a borrower, and (2)
charging the borrower a fee. Held: Respondent was in contempt of
the Court of Appeals, and was ordered to cease and desist from render-
ing title examination service and charging a fee therefor, one judge
dissenting without opinion. Title examination is a service which can
be performed for others only by an attorney and is unauthorized
practice of law if performed by a mortagee's salaried attorney, who
does not receive the examination fee which is charged to the
mortgagor. The court found that since all other items within the
service charge list remained relatively constant, the only variable
that could account for the graduated scale was an attorney's fee for
the title examination. The amount of the remuneration received here
gave rise to an inference that the compensation was actually for legal
services rendered.3 Kentucky State Bar Asen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Assn, 342 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1961).
I The court stated that there are two customary methods in which title
opinions may be legally rendered in this type of business: (1) by a lawyer
representing the borrower; and (2) by a lawyer of the lender's selection who is
paid an attorney's fee for each service rendered. Here the respondent followed
neither method.
Irrespective of whether the attorney receives a salary is paid a percentage,
or is paid for each separate item of work, the result would seem to be the same
so long as the lay agency pays a lawyer one amount for his services and for
those services charges a different amount to the borrower.
2One of the association's officers admitted that part of the loan expense
included in the service charge was allocable to the title examination. Kentucky
State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 842 S.W. 2d 897, 899 (Ky. 1961).
3 See People v. Sipper, 61 Cal.App. 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1948); State ex rel.
Fatzer v. Schmitt, 174 Kan. 581, 258 P.2d 228 (1958); Hughes v. Fort Worth
Nat'l Bank, 164 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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Prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law is to protect the
public4 from substandard legal service 5 and to prevent conflicts of
interest.6
Rule 8.020 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals7 defines the practice
of law as follows:
'The practice of law' is any service rendered involving legal knowledge
or legal advice, whether of representation, counsel, advocacy in or
out of court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the services. But
nothing herein shall prevent any person not holding himself out as
a practicing attorney from drawing any instrument to which he is
a party without consideration unto himself therefor.
In 1901 the Court of Appeals had apparently restricted the meaning of
"the practice of law" to litigation in the courts.8 This definition
persisted until 1937 when the practice of law was held not to be
4 See Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1959);
Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W.2d 53 (1936);
Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951); Niklaus v. Abel
Constr. Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957).
5 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); Commonwealth v.
Tones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 80, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947). For an example of
damages resulting from incompetent legal practice by a layman see Mickel v.
Murphy, 147 Cal.App.2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957).
6 The relation of attorney and client cannot exist between a corporation's
customer and the attorney who is an employee of the corporation, for the reason
that in such a case the attorney is subject to the direction of the corporation and
not the directions of the client. Also his loyalties are engaged by the corporation,
not by the client. Unger v. Landlord's Management Corp., 114 N.J.Eq. 68, -
168 At. 229, 231 (1933) citing with approval In re Co-Operative Law Co., 198
N.Y. 478, -, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934). The relationship between the
attorey-employee and the corporation is that of master-servant. The corporation
stands between its customer and its attorney-employee. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n
v. Northern N.T. Mtg. Ass'n, 22 N.T. 184, -, 123 A.2d 498, 505 (1956).
7Hereinafter cited as RCA. RCA 3.020 was adopted pursuant to Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 80.170 [hereinafter cited as KRS] which provides that the court shall adopt
and promulgate rules defining the practice of law and prescribe a code of pro-
fessional conduct of attorneys and the practice of law and prohibits the adoption
of a rule which prevents a person not holding himself out as an attorney from
writing a deed, mortgage or will or prevents a person from drawing any instru-
ment to which he is a party.
8 Dunlap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 S.W. 441 (1901). The Dunlap case
involved the interpretation of Ky. Stat. § 100 [hereinafter cited as KS] whichprovided: "No person shall practice law as an attorney at law in any court until
he has obtained a license so to do." KS 100 was § 3 of the Act of Oct. 10,
1892, ch. 100p. 258 and was impliedly repealed by an Act of March 17, 1902,
ch. 17, p. 45, then compiled as KS 98-1. See In re Creste, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 249,
98 S.W. 282 (1906). KS 98-1 was impliedly repealed by KS 98a-1 in 1918, ch.
131, p. 559, § 1. KS 98a-1 provided: "No person shall hereafter be licensed as an
attorney or counselor at law in this state except as herein provided for." KS 98a-1
is presently designated as KRS 30.010 which provides:
[N]o person shall practice law in this state without being licensed and sworn,
and no person shall be licensed as an attorney except as provided in this
chapter.
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confined to performing services in judicial actions or proceedings, but
also to include giving advice and preparing instruments of a legal
nature.9 In two later decisions' ° the court in accordance with the
majority view" stated that a corporation could not be licensed to
practice law. However, banks and trust companies engaged regularly
for compensation in such acts as preparing legal instruments and docu-
ments, giving advice to customers, and conducting necessary litigation
through salaried attorneys under the assumption that such conduct
was authorized by Ky. Rev. Stat. 80.170,12 until the decision in Hobson
v. Kentucky Trust Co. 13 In this case the court held that a trust com-
pany, as a part of its services as a fiduciary, could not perform legal
services on the advice of a licensed attorney in its employ without
being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The court did
not base the decision primarily upon the fact that a corporation may
not be licensed to practice law, but upon the commission of specific
acts by the corporation which constituted the unauthorized practice of
law.14
The court stated that the principal case fell within the same
category of services which were condemned in the Hobson case, and
since the title examination was primarily for the benefit of the bor-
rower and clear title was a condition precedent to the granting of the
loan, a legal service was being performed for the borrower rather than
by lender's attorney for the lender. The "primary benefit" test, as
employed by the court here, is a reverse application of the principle
underlying a number of cases in which the performance of certain
legal services, which would otherwise constitute the practice of law,
was permitted by lay persons who had a "substantial interest" in the
subject matter of the transaction and could therefore be considered
9 Howton v. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1, 106 S.W.2d 81 (1937).
10 Kendal v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943); Mutual Bankers
Corp. v. Covington Bros. & Co., 277 Ky. 33, 125 S.W.2d 202 (1938).
1 E.g., Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 244 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d
408 (1954); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863 (1958); Richmond Assn of Credit Men v. Bar Assn, 167 Va. 327,
189 S.E. 153 (1937).
12 See note 7 supra.
is 303 Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946).
14The court in defining these specific acts stated that it was:
[P]ermanently enjoining the defendants from engaging in, or performing
regularly and as a business or advertising or soliciting and holding itself out
to the public as qualified to so act (with or without compensation, directly or
indirectly), any of the following acts in the circumstances indicated, to wit:
writing deeds, wills, conveyances and other legal documents requiring expert
knowledge and equipment in their phraseology so as to comport with the law
relating to such matters; or engaging in preparing any instrument wherein it
is designated as a fiduciary to enforce and administer the provisions in same,
or to hold itself out as possessing the requisite knowledge so to do. Id. at 505,
197 S.W.2d at 461.
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parties acting primarily for their own benefit.' 5 It is now a moot
question whether the respondent was merely determining the risk of
loss through possible failure of the borrower's title it would take if the
loan were made, or whether it was determining the marketability of
the title for the borrower's benefit.' 6 The court summarily placed the
service within the latter classification, thus leaving a vaguely defined
test with no explanation other than that the title examination con-
stituted a condition precedent to the granting of the loan.
An examination of the record in the principal case reveals no
instance in which the attorney's opinion of a title was disclosed to a
borrower, nor that the attorney was present at any closing. Apparently
the Bar Association was complaining of the corporation's charging its
customers for title examination performed by its salaried attorney.
7
15 E.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863 (1958). There are several theories used by the different courts in
determining what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law by laymen or lay
agencies. They are as follows: (1) The customary function of an attorney as
discussed in Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 813 (1935); (2)
The "substantial interest' theory as discussed in Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
supra; (3) The "incidental" theory as discussed in Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co.
v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 898, 312 P.2d 998 (1957) (Giving legal advice,
preparing legal instruments and rendering other services usually performed by an
attorney is not unauthorized practice if it is done incidental to a regular business
or profession.); (4) The "consideration" or "compensation" theory as discussed
in 60 A.B.A. Rep. 521, 532 (1935) (Certain legal services or counselling may be
performed as an incident to a business regularly carried on; the party is
practicing law if he receives consideration for such services.); (5) The "com-
plexty" theory as discussed in Gardner v. Conway, 234 Mnin. 468, 48 N.W.2d
788 (1951) (Certain legal services or counselling has been allowed lay persons
as incidental to their business, but such is not allowed if it involves the resolution
of difficult or complex questions of law.); (6) The "knowledge" theory as
discussed in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yark State
Bank, 844 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931) (When the giving of advice or rendering
services requires any deVee of legal knowledge or skill, it is the practice of law.);
(7) The "public service' theory as discussed in Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, supra, (Where acts are recognized as the practice of law, but
are permitted because they are a necessity or convenience for the public.).
See also Carter v. Trevathan, 309 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1958); Carter v. Brien,
309 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1956); Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 197
S.W.2d 454 (1946). In these Kentucky cases it is stated that it is not the
practice of law for a lay person to draw an instrument to which he is a party
beneficially interested in the subject matter.
16 Under such an approach, where it is encumbent upon a grantor to tender
a deed to the land with clear and marketable title, could the grantee search the
title and draw up the instrument without engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law? If it is a condition precedent that the grantor have a marketable title,
would not the grantee in examining the title be performing a legal service
primarily for the benefit of the grantor? Does the loan company undertake
primarily to pass upon the marketability or validity of the title, or does it
determine the risk that will be taken if the loan is made? Would it make a
difference if the borrower were using the loan for the purchase of the land or
whether he already owned it?
17 The original complaint, filed Oct. 20, 1955 in the Kenton Circuit Court,
stated this as one of its allegations. On April 12, 1958 the complaint was
amended to include the years 1955, 1956, 1957, and the preceding portion of 1958.
(Footnote continued on next page)
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By combining legal charges with commercial services, the respondent
was requiring each borrower to pay a lawyer's fee for title examina-
tion. The examination fees thus paid by the borrowers were being
appropriated to the respondents own use. Notwithstanding a corpora-
tion's disability to practice law,'8 the respondents "package deal"19
combined; all the services come under one charge. See note 20 infra.
placed the practice of law in a commercial surrounding which is
foreign to the proper practice of law and has been soundly condemned.
In In re L.R.,20 the New Jersey court suspended an attorney for
engaging in such a practice; it would be an anomaly if the courts
did not restrain a layman or corporation from the same practice.
2 '
While a corporation may hire an attorney at a fixed salary to repre-
sent it in legal matters, it may not sell these legal services to another,
nor appropriate the receipts to its own use.22 Where a layman or
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
In its supplementary brief, filed May 12, 1969, the petitioner states at page 11 as
follows:
We contend that respondent by following the practice hereinbefore set out has
and is (1) engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by retaining these
substantial sums charged for title examination fee....1 8 Cases cited in note 11 supra.
19 The package deal is a system whereby commercial and legal services are
20 7 N.J. 390, 81 A.2d 725 (1951). The defendant, an attorney, was found
guilty of violating American Bar Association Canons 27 (solicitation), 35 (inter-
mediaries), and 47 (aiding in the unauthorized practice of law). He had formed
a real estate corporation advertising a one-package system which included
servicing a transaction from its inception to its closing. The corporation had
its own legal department (defendant) which expedited and processed every
mortgage. The New Tersey court stated that:
The practice which has been referred to as 'a one-package system" is a
system whereby commercial services, including a lawyer's fee, are rendered
to a person for a single charge. This throws the practice of law into a
commercial atmosphere which is wholly foreign to the concept of a correct
practice and which has been soundly condemned.
Id. at - , 81 A.2d at 726. See also In re Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State
Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958); In re Rothman, 12 N.T. 528, 97 A.2d 621
(1953).
21 Bmp v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, -, 5 N.W.2d 914, 921 (1942).
The court stated that:
An attorney is subject to the discipline of the court for irregular practice
while the layman who engages in similar actions can be reached only by the
more difficult processes of injunction or contempt. It would be strange to
permit to a layman what is condemned and forbidden to an attorney.
22 In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, -, 232 N.W. 318 (1930). Syllabus by
the court:
A corporation cannot itself practice law, nor can it lawfully do so by hiring
an attorney to conduct a general law practice for others for pay, where the
fees earned are to be and are received as income and profit by the
corporation.
See In re Luster, 12 ll.2d 25, 145 N.E.2d 75 (1957) (disciplinary proceeding
against an attorney); Steer v. Land Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763
(Ohio C. P. 1953); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506,
179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Stewart Abstract Co. v. Judicial Comm'n, 131 S.W.2d 686
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939). But see, Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818
(Fla. 1954).
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corporation does collect and appropriate attorney's fees, the party
making such payment should be permitted to recover the amount so
paid.23 The Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Steer v. Land Title
Guarantee & Trust Co. 24 held that:
[A] salaried lawyer for a title company may render an opinion to his
own corporate principal without being guilty of unauthorized practice
of law, but when the corporate principal 'sells' that opinion, legal
in nature, to an outsider, that corporate principal is guilty of illegally
practicing law .... [T]he corporate principal is . . . guilty of un-
authorized practice of law by making such a 'sale' of a legal opinion
to a third party even though that legal opinion was prepared for it by
its salaried lawyer, directly in the course of the corporate principal's
business activities.
2 5
If, in the principal case, the respondent's subterfuge had been
allowed, the result would be to permit a corporation to engage in the
business of handling legal matters for others, to destroy the confidential
relationship an attorney bears to his client2" and to lessen the usefulness
of the profession to the public. For the respondents attorney to aid it
in the practice of law or to participate in or to sanction such a practice
was improper.27 The privilege conferred on the lawyer is individual
and subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper professional
and moral standards of conduct. The responsibilities and duties con-
nected with this privilege cannot be delegated to nor shared with a
corporate employer. Just as a lawyer may not share his professional
responsibility with a corporation, neither may he share his professional
emoluments with it.
28
The appropriation of the legal fees for title examination, notwith-
standing the "primary benefit" test, placed the respondent in the
position of practicing law and he was therefore held to be in contempt
of court. To laymen a bank with its salaried attorney may seem
infallible, but the bank, the attorney, and the public must be reminded
of a basic principle-a corporation simply cannot practice law. Every
time a layman or lay agency performs a legal service for another,
23Lowe v. Presley, 86 Ga.App. 828, 71 S.E.2d 730 (1952). Cf., Vogel v.
Lotz, 26 N.T.Misc. 281, 60 A.2d 815 (1948).
24 113 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio C. P. 1953).
25 Id. at 766-67.
28 See generally note 6 supra.
27 Canon 47 (RCA 3.540) provides:
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in
aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay
agency, personal or corporate.
The Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association is recognized as a sound
statement of the standard of professional conduct and as persuasive authority by
the Kentucky court. RCA 3.170; In re Kenkel, 279 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1955).
28 A.B.A., Opinions of the Committee of Professional Ethics and Grievances
of the American Bar Association, Opinion 8, at 71 (1957 ed.).
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directly or indirectly, the control of the judicial system is weakened,
and the public is subjected to the dangers of unauthorized practice.
These laymen and lay agencies are exploiting the legal profession,
and in many cases no protest is being made by the bar; to the
contrary, some members of the bar are aiding corporations in un-
authorized practice. Lawyers owe it to the profession and to the
public to bring these matters to the knowledge of the court.
Hugh L. Cannon
